Legal Protection under the Norwegian Competition Act: Supervisory Authorities, Appeal Bodies, and Courts

In December last year, an expert committee delivered its proposal for a revised Norwegian Competition Act (NOU 2025:11 Revised Competition Act). The report revealed disagreements on a range of issues, from institutional design to procedural safeguards. Yet the most important questions raised by the reform process extend beyond competition law itself. They concern how Norway should organize legal protection in a legal landscape increasingly shaped by EEA law and the European Convention on Human Rights, including what powers should be entrusted to supervisory authorities, what role appeal bodies should play, and where the courts should fit into the system. The report also illustrates the challenges created by the growing EEA backlog. Notably, it includes proposals concerning private damages enforcement that draw inspiration from the EU Damages Directive, even though the Directive has not yet been made part of the EEA Agreement.

Author: Ingrid Barlund, Faculty of Law, Unversity of Bergen

A reform debate extending beyond competition law

On 27 March, the consultation period for NOU 2025:11 Revised Competition Act came to an end. In the Norwegian online newspaper Rett24 (3 December 2025), the report was described as presenting “a multitude of majority and minority views”. The differing views reflect disagreements on fundamental issues that call for a broader approach and warrant closer attention from the Norwegian legislator, including the relationship between political control and independent supervisory authorities, the procedural framework for administrative decisions imposing sanctions, and subsequent review by appeal bodies and courts to ensure effective legal protection.

Europeanisation, EEA backlog and the limits of procedural autonomy

Competition law is highly Europeanised. As in several other areas, one must navigate between purely national law, EEA law, and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). While the substantive rules are harmonized within the EEA, the procedural starting point is national autonomy. However, this autonomy is limited by the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, the requirement of effective legal protection, and by secondary legislation that harmonizes rules on enforcement. The procedural leeway is therefore narrower than the starting point suggests. Still, the limits are unclear, partly due to several EU legal acts of EEA-relevance that have not yet been made part of the EEA Agreement. Of particular significance to the national enforcement of EEA competition law: neither the ECN+ Directive nor the Damages Directive is part of the EEA Agreement.

Regulatory fragmentation and the need for clearer procedural frameworks

An important structural question for the national legislator concerns the division of regulatory responsibilities between the Competition Act and the general legislation on public administration and civil and criminal procedure: which matters ought to be specifically regulated within competition law, and which ought to be left to general administrative and procedural law? The fact that the Expert Committee did not address this in NOU 2025:11 was due to the mandate it was given and to the limited time available.

EEA law requirements for national enforcement of competition rules have become stricter over time, a development mirrored in many other areas of the internal market. One consequence is the increasing number of independent supervisory authorities and quasi-judicial appeal bodies. Norway lacks a comprehensive framework governing such bodies. Although the new Public Administration Act includes a chapter on administrative sanctions, it does not adequately capture developments in EEA and ECHR law.

Institutional design: supervision, independence and judicial review

Discussions on decision-making authority and procedural rules raise fundamental questions about the organization of public administration, appeal bodies, and courts. This also concerns the relationship between political control and operational independence: the Competition Authority is an expert body operating within politically defined frameworks. What scope should there be for instructions, particularly in situations involving conflicting objectives, and what are the consequences for legal certainty? And how should the allocation of responsibilities between administrative authorities and courts be designed when legal requirements increasingly stem from outside national law? It is crucial to distinguish between what follows from the EEA Agreement and the ECHR, and the scope of discretion left to national law in organizing and regulating administrative and judicial systems. Classification under Norwegian law is not always decisive; the key issue is whether the body satisfies the requirements of a “tribunal”, which directly affects the division of responsibilities between courts and administrative authorities. The ECHR provides wide norms with limited detailed guidance, making the distinction between legal constraints and national discretion particularly important.

Three core challenges for the legislator

Three issues stand out as particularly important for further examination and follow-up by the legislator.

1. Administrative sanctions and procedural safeguards

First, Norway lacks clear procedural rules for administrative sanctions. This is particularly evident in competition law, where the Competition Authority may impose high administrative fines without clear procedural rules. At the same time, enforcement follows a dual system, with undertakings subject to administrative sanctions and individuals to criminal prosecution. Several legal safeguards are at stake without being coordinated within a comprehensive framework.

2. Appeal bodies and the absence of administrative courts

Second, Norway does not have administrative courts, but instead a mixed system of appeal bodies and ordinary courts. Several appeal bodies function as quasi-judicial bodies. In competition law, the Competition Appeals Tribunal even replaces the district court as the first instance in most cases.

Considerations of resources and expertise may support different procedural models. Administrative proceedings are typically written, which promotes efficiency and cost-effectiveness, whereas court proceedings in Norway include lengthy oral hearings and are more resource-intensive. There is, however, disagreement as to which procedural forms best safeguard legal protection.

Procedures before appeal bodies are often regulated by delegated legislation (regulations), typically adopted by ministries, contributing to a fragmented legal framework. This raises the question of whether a unified procedural statute for administrative appeal bodies could provide a more coherent legal framework, while still allowing room for their particular characteristics, and highlights more fundamental questions about the role of appeal bodies and their relationship with the courts.

3. Private enforcement and collective redress

Third, mechanisms to ensure the rights of private third parties are weakly developed across several areas of law, not only in competition law. Although the right to damages has long been recognized in competition law, it is in practice difficult to enforce. Collective actions, particularly opt-out models, are rarely available, and the lack of funding mechanisms means that this right often remains theoretical. The Norwegian Supreme Court’s invitation for further legislative scrutiny in HR-2023-1034-A should therefore be followed up by the legislature.

Concluding reflections: legal protection in a Europeanised legal order

The challenges faced by the Expert Committee behind NOU 2025:11 reflect a broader development in which national legal systems are becoming more closely integrated into a European legal structure with stricter requirements for effective legal protection. This calls for more comprehensive solutions and a willingness to undertake fundamental reforms across legal fields.

This post is based on a guest editorial originally published in Norwegian in Lov og Rett, vol. 65 (2026), pp. 225–226. The original publication is available under DOI 10.18261/lor.65.4.2.

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 About the Author

Ingrid Margrethe Halvorsen Barlund is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen, and served on the government-appointed law reform committee tasked with preparing NOU 2025:11 Revised Competition Act.

(ingrid.halvorsen@uib.no)

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How to cite

Barlund, Ingrid (2026): Legal Protection under the Norwegian Competition Act: Supervisory Authorities, Appeal Bodies, and Courts. Blog. EFTA-Studies.org.